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It is common in recommendation systems that users both consume and produce information as they make strategic
choices under uncertainty.While a social plannerwould balance “exploration” and “exploitation” using amulti-armed
bandit algorithm, users’ incentives may tilt this balance in favor of exploitation. We consider Bayesian Exploration:
a simple model in which the recommendation system (the “principal”) controls the information flow to the users (the
“agents”) and strives to incentivize exploration via information asymmetry. A single round of this model is a version
of a well-known “Bayesian Persuasion game” from [24]. We allow heterogeneous users, relaxing a major assumption
from prior work that users have the same preferences from one time step to another. The goal is now to learn the
best personalized recommendations. One particular challenge is that it may be impossible to incentivize some of the
user types to take some of the actions, no matter what the principal does or how much time she has. We consider
several versions of the model, depending on whether and when the user types are reported to the principal, and
design a near-optimal “recommendation policy” for each version. We also investigate how the model choice and the
diversity of user types impact the set of actions that can possibly be “explored” by each type.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recommendation systems are ubiquitous in online markets (e.g., Netflix for movies, Amazon for products,
Yelp for restaurants, etc.), high-quality recommendations being a crucial part of their value proposition. A
typical recommendation system encourages its users to submit feedback on their experiences, and aggre-
gates this feedback in order to provide better recommendations in the future. Each user plays a dual rule:
she consumes information from the previous users (indirectly, via recommendations), and produces new
information (e.g., a review) that benefits future users. This dual role creates a tension between exploration,
exploitation, and users’ incentives.
A social planner – a hypothetical entity that controls users for the sake of common good –would balance
“exploration” of insufficiently known alternatives and “exploitation” of the information acquired so far.
Designing algorithms to trade off these two objectives is a well-researched subject in machine learning
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and operations research. However, a given user who decides to “explore” typically suffers all the downside
of this decision, whereas the upside (improved recommendations) is spread over many users in the future.
Therefore, users’ incentives are skewed in favor of exploitation. As a result, observations may be collected
at a slower rate, and suffer from selection bias (e.g., ratings of a particular movie may mostly come from
people who like this type of movies). Moreover, in some natural but idealized examples (e.g., [30, 33])
optimal recommendations are never found because they are never explored.
Thus, we have a problem of incentivizing exploration. Providing monetary incentives can be financially
or technologically unfeasible, and relying on voluntary exploration can lead to selection biases. A recent
line of work, started by [30], relies on the inherent information asymmetry between the recommendation
system and a user. These papers posit a simple model, termed Bayesian Exploration in [34]. The recom-
mendation system is a “principal” that interacts with a stream of self-interested “agents” arriving one by
one. Each agent needs to make a decision: take an action from a given set of alternatives. The principal
issues a recommendation, and observes the outcome, but cannot direct the agent to take a particular action.
The problem is to design a “recommendation policy” for the principal that learns over time to make good
recommendations and ensures that the agents are incentivized to follow this recommendation. A single
round of this model is a version of a well-known “Bayesian Persuasion game” [24].
Our scope. We study Bayesian Exploration with agents that can have heterogenous preferences. The
preferences of an agent are encapsulated in her type, e.g., vegan vs meat-lover. When an agent takes a
particular action, the outcome depends on the action itself (e.g., the selection of restaurant), the “state” of
the world (e.g., the qualities of the restaurants), and the type of the agent. The state is persistent (does not
change over time), but initially not known; a Bayesian prior on the state is common knowledge. In each
round, the agent type is drawn independently from a fixed and known distribution. The principal strives
to learn the best possible recommendation for each agent type.
We consider three models, depending on whether and when the agent type is revealed to the principal:
the type is revealed immediately after the agent arrives (public types), the type is revealed only after the
principal issues a recommendation (reported types),1 and the type is never revealed (private types). We
design a near-optimal recommendation policy for each modeling choice.
Explorability. A distinctive feature of Bayesian Exploration is that it may be impossible to incentivize
some agent types to take some actions, no matter what the principal does or how much time she has. For
a more precise terminology, a given type-action pair is explorable if this agent type takes this action under
some recommendation policy in some round with positive probability. This action is also called explorable
for this type. Thus: some type-action pairs might not be explorable. Moreover, one may need to explore to
find out which pairs are explorable. The set of explorable pairs is interesting in its own right as they bound
the welfare of a setting. Recommendation policies cannot do better than the “best explorable action” for a
particular agent type: an explorable action with a largest reward in the realized state.
Comparative statics for explorability. We study how the set of all explorable type-action pairs (ex-
plorable set) is affected by the model choice and the diversity of types. First, we find that for each problem
1Reported types may arise if the principal asks agents to report the type after the recommendation is issued, e.g., in a survey.
While the agents are allowed to misreport their respective types, they have no incentives to do that.
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instance the explorable set stays the same if we transition from public types to reported types, and can
only become smaller if we transition from reported types to private types. We provide a concrete example
when the latter transition makes a huge difference. Second, we vary the distribution D of agent types.
For public types (and therefore also for reported types), we find that the explorable set is determined by
the support set of D. Further, if we make the support set larger, then the explorable set can only become
larger. In other words, diversity of agent types helps exploration. We provide a concrete example when the
explorable set increases very substantially even if the support set increases by a single type. However, for
private types the picture is quite different: we provide an example when diversity hurts, in the same sense
as above. Intuitively, with private types, diversity muddles the information available to the principal mak-
ing it harder to learn about the state of the world, whereas for public types diversity helps the principal
refine her belief about the state.
Our techniques. As a warm-up, we first develop a recommendation policy for public types. In the long
run, our policy matches the benchmark of “best explorable action”. While it is easy to prove that such a
policy exists, the challenge is to provide it as an explicit procedure. Our policy focuses on exploring all
explorable type-action pairs. Exploration needs to proceed gradually, whereby exploring one action may
enable the policy to explore another. In fact, exploring some action for one type may enable the policy to
explore some action for another type. Our policy proceeds in phases: in each phase, we explore all actions
for each type that can be explored using information available at the start of the phase. Agents of different
types learn separately, in per-type “threads"; the threads exchange information after each phase.
An important building block is the analysis of the single-round game. We use information theory to
characterize how much state-relevant information the principal has. In particular, we prove a version of
information-monotonicity: the set of all explorable type-action pairs can only increase if the principal has
more information.
As our main contribution, we develop a policy for private types. In this model, recommending one
particular action to the current agent is not very meaningful because the agents’ type is not known to
the principal. Instead, one can recommend a menu: a mapping from agent types to actions. Analogous to
the case of public types, we focus on explorable menus and gradually explore all such menus, eventually
matching the Bayesian-expected reward of the best explorable menu. One difficulty is that exploring a
given menu does not immediately reveal the reward of a particular type-action pair (because multiple
types could map to the same action). Consequently, even keeping track of what the policy knows is now
non-trivial. The analysis of the single-round game becomes more involved, as one needs to argue about
“approximate information-monotonicity”.To handle these issues, our recommendation policy satisfies only
a relaxed version of incentive-compatibility.
In the reported types model, we face a similar issue, but achieve a much stronger result: we design
a policy which matches our public-types benchmark in the long run. This may seem counterintuitive
because “reported types” are completely useless to the principal in the single-round game (whereas public
types are very useful). Essentially, we reduce the problem to the public types case, at the cost of a much
longer exploration.
Discussion. This paper, as well as all prior work on incentivizing exploration, relies on very standard yet
idealized assumptions of Bayesian rationality and the “power to commit” (i.e., principal can announce a
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policy and commit to implementing it). A recent paper [23] attempts to mitigate these assumptions (in a
setting with homogeneous agents). However, some form of the “power to commit" assumption appears
necessary to make any progress.
We do not attempt to elicit agents’ types when they are not public, in the sense that our recommendation
to a given agent is not contingent on anything that this agent reports. However, our result for reported
types is already the best possible, in the sense that the explorable set is the same as for public types, so (in
the same sense) elicitation is not needed.
Related work. Bayesian Exploration with homogenous agents was introduced in [30], and largely re-
solved: for optimal policy in the case of two actions and deterministic utilities [30], for explorability [34],
and for regret minimization and stochastic utilities [33].
Bayesian Exploration with heterogenous agents and public types is studied in [33], under a very strong
assumption which ensures explorability of all type-action pairs, and in [34], where a fixed tuple of agent
types arrives in each round and plays a game. [34] focus on explorability of joint actions. Our approach
for the public-type case is similar on a high level, but simpler and more efficient, essentially because we
focus on type-action pairs rather than joint actions.
A very recent paper [16] (ours is independent work) studies incentivizing explorationwith heterogenous
agents and private types, but allows monetary transfers. Assuming that each action is preferred by some
agent type, they design an algorithm with a (very) low regret, and conclude that diversity helps in their
setting.
Several papers study “incentivizing exploration" in substantially different models: with a social network
[6]; with time-discounted utilities [10]; with monetary incentives [16, 19]; with a continuous information
flow and a continuum of agents [15]; with long-lived agents and “exploration" separate from payoff genera-
tion [29, 31, 32]; with fairness [25]. Also, seminal papers [11, 27] study scenarios with long-lived, exploring
agents and no principal.
Recommendation policies with no explicit exploration, and closely related “greedy algorithm" in multi-
armed bandits, have been studied recently [7, 26, 36, 37]. A common theme is that the greedy algorithm
performs well under substantial assumptions on the diversity of types. Yet, it suffers Ω(T ) regret in the
worst case.2
Exploration-exploitationtradeoff receivedmuch attention over the past decades, usually under the rubric
of “multi-armed bandits", see books [13, 14, 21]. Absent incentives, Bayesian Exploration with public types
is a well-studied problem of “contextual bandits" (with deterministic rewards and a Bayesian prior). A
single round of Bayesian Exploration is a version of the Bayesian Persuasion game [24], where the signal
observed by the principal is distinct from the state. Exploration-exploitation problems with incentives
issues arise in several other scenarios: dynamic pricing, e.g., [5, 9, 28], dynamic auctions [8], advertising
auctions [3, 4, 18], human computation [20, 22, 38], and repeated actions, e.g., [1, 2, 12].
2 MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Bayesian Exploration is a game between a principal and T agents. The game consists of T rounds. Each
round t ∈ [T ] proceeds as follows: a new agent t arrives, receives a messagemt from the principal, chooses
2This is a well-known folklore result in various settings; e.g., see [35, 37].
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an action at from a fixed action spaceA, and collects a reward rt ∈ [0, 1] that is immediately observed by
the principal. Each agent t has a type θt ∈ Θ, drawn independently from a fixed distribution D, and an
action space A (same for all agents). There is uncertainty, captured by a “state of nature" ω ∈ Ω, hence-
forth simply the state, drawn from a Bayesian prior P at the beginning of time and fixed across rounds.
The reward rt = u(θt ,at ,ω) ∈ [0, 1] of agent t is determined by its type θt , the action at ∈ A chosen by
this agent, and the state ω, for some fixed and deterministic reward function u : Θ × A × Ω → [0, 1]. The
principal’s messagesmt are generated according to a randomized online algorithm π termed “recommen-
dation policy". Thus, an instance of Bayesian Exploration consists of the time horizonT , the sets A,Θ,Ω,
the type distributionD, the prior P, and the reward function u.
The knowledge structure is as follows. The type distribution D, the Bayesian prior P, the reward func-
tion u, and the recommendation policy are common knowledge. Each agent t knows her own type θt , and
observes nothing else except the message mt . We consider three model variants, depending on whether
and when the principal learns the agent’s type: the type is revealed immediately after the agent arrives
(public types), the type is revealed only after the principal issues a recommendation (reported types), the
type is not revealed (private types).
LetHt denote the history observed by the principal at round t , immediately before it chooses its message
mt . Hence, it equals {(r1,θ1), . . . , (rt−1,θt−1),θt } for public types, {(r1,θ1), . . . , (rt−1,θt−1)} for reported
types, and {r1, . . . , rt−1} for private types.3 Formally, this is the input to the recommendation policy in
each round t . Borrowing terminology from the Bayesian Persuasion literature, we will often refer to the
history as the signal. We denote the set of all possible histories (signals) at time t byHt .
The recommendation policy π , the type distributionD, the state distributionP, and the reward function
u induce a joint distribution D(Ω,Ht ) over states and histories, henceforth called the signal structure at
round t . Note that it is known to agent t .
We are ready to state agents’ decision model. Each agent t , given the realized message m, chooses an
action at so as to maximize her Bayesian-expected reward
E[rt ] ≡ E
(ω,Ht )∼D(Ω,Ht )
[
E
mt∼π (Ht )
[u(θt ,at ,ω) |mt =m]
]
.
Given the instance of Bayesian Exploration, the goal of the principal is to choose a policy π that maximizes
(Bayesian-expected) total reward, i.e.,
∑T
t=1 E[rt ].4
We assume that the setsA, Θ and Ω are finite. We use ω0 as the random variable for the state, and write
Pr[ω] for Pr[ω0 = ω]. Similarly, we write Pr[θ ] for Pr[θt = θ ].
Bayesian-incentive compatibility. For public types, we assume the messagemt in each round is a rec-
ommended action a ∈ A which, for convenience, we sometimes write asmt (θt ). For private and reported
types, we assume that the messagemt in each round is amenu mapping types to actions, i.e.,mt : Θ → A.
We further assume π is Bayesian incentive-compatible.
Definition 2.1. Let Et be the event that the agents have followed principal’s recommendations before
round t , i.e., as =ms (θs ) for all rounds s < t . The recommendation policy π is Bayesian incentive compatible
3For randomized policies, the history also contains policy’s random seed in each round.
4While the principal must commit to the policy given only the problem instance, the policy itself observes the history and thus
can adapt recommendations to inferences about the state based on the history. See Example 3.2.
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(BIC) if for all rounds t and messagesm such that
Pr
(ω,Ht )∼D(Ω,Ht )
[m = π (Ht ) | Et ] > 0,
it holds that for all types θ and actions a,
E [ u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,a,ω) | mt =m, Et ] ≥ 0, (1)
where the expectation is over (ω,Ht ) ∼ D(Ω,Ht ).
The above assumptions are without loss of generality, by a suitable version of Myerson’s “revelation prin-
ciple".
Explorability and benchmarks. For public types, a type-action pair (θ ,a) ∈ Θ × A is called eventually-
explorable in state ω if there is some BIC recommendation policy that, for T large enough, eventually
recommends this action to this agent type with positive probability. Then action a is called eventually-
explorable for type θ and state ω. The set of all such actions is denotedAω,θ .
Likewise, for private types, a menu is called eventually-explorable in state ω if there is some BIC rec-
ommendation policy that eventually recommends this menu with positive probability. The set of all such
menus is denotedMω .
Our benchmark is the best eventually-explorable recommendation for each type. For public and private
types, resp., this is
OPTpub =
∑
θ ∈Θ,ω ∈Ω
Pr[ω] · Pr[θ ] · max
a∈Aω,θ
u(θ ,a,ω). (2)
OPTpri =
∑
ω ∈Ω
Pr[ω] · max
m∈Mω
∑
θ ∈Θ
Pr[θ ] · u(θ ,m(θ ),ω). (3)
We have OPTpub ≥ OPTpri, essentially because any BIC policy for private types can be simulated as a BIC
policy for public types. We provide an example (Example 3.2) when OPTpub > OPTpri.
3 COMPARATIVE STATICS
Wediscuss how the set of all eventually-explorable type-actionpairs (explorable set) is affected by themodel
choice and the diversity of types. The explorable set is all information that can possibly be learned in the
public-types model. All else equal, settings with larger explorable set have greater or equal total expected
reward, both in benchmark (2) and in our approximation guarantees. For private types, the exploration set
provides an “upper bound" on the information available to the principal, because the principal does not
directly observe the agent types.
Explorability and the model choice. Fix an instance of Bayesian Exploration. LetApubω andApriω be the
explorable set for a given state ω, for public and private types, respectively.5 We will show in Section 4.3
that the explorable set for reported types isApubω , too.
Claim 3.1. Apriω ⊆ Apubω .
5Equivalently,Apriω is the set of all type-action pairs (θ,m(θ)) that appear in some eventually-explorable menum ∈ Mω in state
ω with private types.
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The idea is that one can simulate any BIC recommendation policy for private types with a BIC recom-
mendation policy for public types; we omit the details.
Interestingly,Apriω can in fact be a strict subset of Apubω :
Example 3.2. There are 2 states, 2 types and 2 actions: Ω = Θ = A = {0, 1}. States and types are drawn
uniformly at random: Pr[ω = 0] = Pr[θ = 0] = 12 . Rewards are defined as follows:
a = 0 a = 1
θ = 0 u = 3 u = 4
θ = 1 u = 2 u = 0
a = 0 a = 1
θ = 0 u = 2 u = 0
θ = 1 u = 3 u = 4
Table 1. Rewards u(θ ,a,ω) when ω = 0 and ω = 1.
Claim 3.3. In Example 3.2, Apriω is a strict subset ofApubω .
Proof. Action 0 is preferred by both types initially. Thus in the first round, the principal must recom-
mend action 0 in order for the policy to be BIC. Hence type-action pairs {(0, 0), (1, 0)} are eventually-
explorable in all models.
In the second round, the principal knows the reward of the first-round agent. When types are public or
reported, the reward together with the type is sufficient information for the principal to learn the state.
Moving forward, the principal can now recommend the higher-reward action for each type (either directly
or, in the case of reported types, through a menu). Thus, type-action pair (0, 1) is eventually-explorable
when ω = 0 and, similarly, type-action pair (1, 1) is eventually-explorable when ω = 1.
For private types, samples from the first-round menu (which, as argued above, must recommend action
0 for both types) do not convey any information about the state, as they have the same distribution in both
states. Therefore, action 1 is not eventually-explorable, for either type and either state. 
Explorability and diversity of agent types. Fix an instance of Bayesian Exploration with type distribu-
tionD. We consider how the explorable set changes if we modify the type distributionD in this instance
to some other distribution D ′. LetAω and A ′ω be the corresponding explorable sets, for each state ω.
For public and reported types, we show that the explorable set is determined by the support set of D,
denoted support(D), and can only increase if the support set increases:
Claim 3.4. Consider Bayesian Exploration with public types. Then:
(a) if support(D) = support(D ′) then Aω = A ′ω .
(b) if support(D) ⊂ support(D ′) then Aω ⊆ A ′ω .
Proof Sketch. Consider public types (the case of reported types then follows by arguments in Sec-
tion 4.3). Let π be a BIC recommendation policy for the instance with type distribution D and suppose π
eventually explores type-action pairs Aω for this instance and state ω. Consider the instance with type
distributionD ′. Extend π to a policy π ′ as follows: let T ′ be the subsequence of T for which D(θt ) > 0. If
t < T ′, then recommend the action a that maximizes agent t ’s Bayesian-expected reward. If t ∈ T ′, then
consider the sub-history H ≡ HT ′t restricted to T ′ and recommend action a ∼ π (H ). Then π ′ is BIC for the
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instance with type distribution D ′. Furthermore, π ′ eventually explores the same set of type-action pairs
Aω for this modified instance as well (and possibly more) as every history that occurs with positive prob-
ability in the original instance occurs as a sub-history in the modified instance with positive probability
as well. 
For private types, the situation is more complicated. More types can help for some problem instances.
For example, if different types have disjoint sets of available actions (more formally: say, disjoint sets of
actions with positive rewards) then we are essentially back to the case of reported types, and the conclu-
sions in Claim 3.4 apply. On the other hand, we can use Example 3.2 to show that more types can hurt
explorability when types are private. Recall that in this example, for private types only action 0 can be
recommended. Now consider a less diverse instance in which only type 0 appears. After one agent in that
type chooses action 0, the state is revealed to the principal. For example, when the state ω = 0, action 1
can be recommended to future agents. This shows that, in this example, explorable set increases when we
have fewer types.
4 PUBLIC TYPES
In this section, we develop our recommendation policy for public types. Throughout, OPT = OPTpub.
Theorem 4.1. Consider an arbitrary instance of Bayesian Exploration with public types. There exists a BIC
recommendation policy with expected total reward at least (T −C) · OPT, for some constant C that depends on
the problem instance but not onT . This policy explores all type-action pairs that are eventually-explorable for
a given state.
4.1 A single round of Bayesian Exploration
Signal and explorability.Wefirst analyzewhat actions can be explored by a BIC policy in a single round t
of Bayesian Exploration for public types, as a function of the history. Throughout, we suppress θ and t from
our notation. Let S be a random variable equal to the history at round t (referred to as a signal throughout
this section), s be a realization of S , and S = D(Ω,H) be the signal structure: the joint distribution of
(ω,S). Note different policies induce different histories and hence different signal structures. Thus it will
be important to be explicit about the signal structure throughout this section.
Definition 4.2. Consider a single-round of Bayesian Explorationwhen the principal receives signal S with
signal structure S. An action a ∈ A is called signal-explorable for a realized signal s if there exists a BIC
recommendation policy π such that Pr[π (s) = a] > 0. The set of all such actions is denoted as EXs [S]. The
signal-explorable set, denoted EX[S], is the random subset of actions EXS [S].
Information-monotonicity. We compare the information content of two signals using the notion of
conditional mutual information (see Appendix A for background). Essentially, we show that a more infor-
mative signal leads to the same or larger explorable set.
Definition 4.3. We say that signal S is at least as informative as signal S ′ if I (S ′;ω | S) = 0.
8
Intuitively, the condition I (S ′;ω0 |S) = 0means if one is given random variable S , one can learn no further
information from S ′ about ω0. Note that this condition depends not only on the signal structures of the
two signals, but also on their joint distribution.
Lemma 4.4. Let S,S ′ be two signals with signal structures S,S ′. If S is at least as informative as S ′, then
EXs ′[S ′] ⊆ EXs [S] for all s ′, s such that Pr[S = s,S ′ = s ′] > 0.
Proof. Consider any BIC recommendation policy π ′ for signal structure S ′. We construct π for signal
structure S by setting Pr[π (s) = a] = ∑s ′ Pr[π ′(s ′) = a] · Pr [S ′ = s ′ | S = s]. Notice that I (S ′;ω0 | S) = 0
implies S ′ and ω0 are independent given S , i.e Pr[S ′ = s ′ | S = s] · Pr[ω0 = ω | S = s] = Pr[S ′ = s ′,ω0 = ω |
S = s] for all s, s ′,ω. Therefore, for all s ′ and ω,
∑
s Pr[S ′ = s ′ | S = s] · Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s]
=
∑
s Pr[S ′ = s ′ | S = s] · Pr[ω0 = ω | S = s] · Pr[S = s]
=
∑
s Pr[S ′ = s ′,ω0 = ω | S = s] · Pr[S = s]
=
∑
s Pr[S = s,S ′ = s ′,ω0 = ω]
= Pr[ω0 = ω,S ′ = s ′].
Therefore π ′ being BIC implies that π is also BIC. Indeed, for any a,a′ ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, by plugging in
the definition of π ,
∑
ω,s Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s] · (u(θ ,a′,ω) − u(θ ,a,ω)) · Pr[π (s) = a]
=
∑
ω,s ′ Pr[ω0 = ω,S ′ = s ′] · (u(θ ,a′,ω) − u(θ ,a,ω)) · Pr[π ′(s ′) = a]
≥ 0.
Finally, for any s ′, s,a such that Pr [S ′ = s ′,S = s] > 0 and Pr[π ′(s ′) = a] > 0, we have Pr[π (s) = a] > 0.
This implies EXs ′[S ′] ⊆ EXs [S]. 
Max-Support Policy. We can solve the following LP to check whether a particular action a0 ∈ A is
signal-explorable given a particular realized signal s0 ∈ X. In this LP, we represent a policy π as a set of
numbers xa,s = Pr[π (s) = a], for each action a ∈ A and each feasible signal s ∈ X.
maximize xa0,s0
subject to:∑
ω ∈Ω,s ∈X Pr[ω] · Pr[s | ω]·
(u(θ ,a,ω) − u(θ ,a′,ω)) · xa,s ≥ 0 ∀a,a′ ∈ A∑
a∈A xa,s = 1, ∀s ∈ X
xa,s ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ X,a ∈ A
Since the constraints in this LP characterize any BIC recommendation policy, it follows that action a0
is signal-explorable given realized signal s0 if and only if the LP has a positive solution. If such solution
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exists, define recommendation policy π = πa0,s0 by setting Pr[π (s) = a] = xa,s for all a ∈ A, s ∈ X. Then
this is a BIC recommendation policy such that Pr[π (s0) = a0] > 0.
Definition 4.5. Given a signal structureS, a BIC recommendation policy π is calledmax-support if ∀s ∈ X
and signal-explorable action a ∈ A given s, Pr[π (s) = a] > 0.
It is easy to see that we obtain max-support recommendation policy by averaging the πa,s policies
defined above. Specifically, the following policy is BIC and max-support:
πmax =
1
|X|
∑
s ∈X
1
|EXs [S]|
∑
a∈EXs [S]
πa,s . (4)
Maximal Exploration. We design a subroutine MaxExplore which outputs a sequence of actions with
two properties: it includes every signal-explorable action at least once, and each action in the sequence
marginally distributed as πmax. The length of this sequence, denoted Lθ , should satisfy
Lθ ≥ max(a,s)∈A×X with Pr[πmax(s)=a],0
1
Pr[πmax(s) = a] . (5)
This step is essentially from [34]; we provide the details below for the sake of completeness. The idea
is to put Ca = Lθ · Pr[πmax(S) = a] copies of each action a into a sequence of length Lθ and randomly
permute the sequence. However, Ca might not be an integer, and in particular may be smaller than 1. The
latter issue is resolved bymaking Lθ sufficiently large. For the former issue, we first put ⌊Ca⌋ copies of each
action a into the sequence, and then sample the remaining Lθ −
∑
a ⌊Ca⌋ actions according to distribution
pres(a) = Ca−⌊Ca ⌋
Lθ−
∑
a ⌊Ca ⌋ . For details, see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Subroutine MaxExplore
1: Input: type θ , signal S and signal structure S.
2: Output: a list of actions α
3: Compute πmax as per (4)
4: Initialize Res = Lθ .
5: for each action a ∈ A do
6: Ca ← Lθ · Pr[πmax(S) = a]
7: Add ⌊Ca⌋ copies of action a into list α .
8: Res ← Res − ⌊Ca⌋.
9: pres(a) ← Ca − ⌊Ca⌋
10: pres(a) ← pres(a)/Res, ∀a ∈ A.
11: Sample Res many actions from distribution pres independently and add these actions into α .
12: Randomly permute the actions in α .
13: return α .
Claim 4.6. Given type θ and signal S , MaxExplore outputs a sequence of Lθ actions. Each action in the
sequence marginally distributed as πmax. For any action a such that Pr[πmax = a] > 0, a shows up in the
sequence at least once with probability exactly 1. MaxExplore runs in time polynomial in Lθ , |A|, |Ω| and |X|
(size of the support of the signal).
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Algorithm 2Main procedure for public types
1: Initialization: signal S1 = S1 =⊥, phase count l = 1, index iθ = 0 for each type θ ∈ Θ.
2: for rounds t = 1 to T do
3: if l ≤ |A| · |Θ| then
4: {Exploration}
5: Call thread thread(θt ).
6: if every type θ has finished Lθ rounds in the current phase (iθ ≥ Lθ ) then
7: Start a new phase: l ← l + 1.
8: Let Sl be the signal for phase l : the set of all observed type-action-reward triples.
9: Let Sl be the signal structure for Sl given the realized type sequence (θ1, ...,θt ).
10: else
11: {Exploitation}
12: Recommend the best explored action for agent type θt .
4.2 Main Recommendation Policy
Algorithm 2 is the main procedure of our recommendation policy. It consists of two parts: exploration,
which explores all the eventually-explorable actions, and exploitation, which simply recommends the best
explored action for a given type. The exploration part proceeds in phases. In each phase l , each type θ gets
a sequence of Lθ actions fromMaxExplore using the data collected before this phase starts. The phase ends
when every agent type θ has finished Lθ rounds. We pick parameter Lθ large enough so that the condition
(5) is satisfied for all phases l and all possible signals S = Sl . (Note that Lθ is finite because there are only
finitely many such signals.) After |A| · |Θ| phases, our recommendation policy enters the exploitation part.
See Algorithm 2 for details.
There is a separate thread for each type θ , denoted thread(θ ), which is called whenever an agent of this
type shows up; see Algorithm 3. In a given phase l , it recommends the Lθ actions computed byMaxExplore,
then switches to the best explored action. The thread only uses the information collected before the current
phase starts: the signal Sl and signal structure Sl .
Algorithm 3 Thread for agent type θ : thread(θ )
1: if this is the first call of thread(θ ) of the current phase then
2: Compute a list of Lθ actions αθ ← MaxExplore(θ ,Sl ,Sl ).
3: Initialize the index of type θ : iθ ← 0.
4: iθ ← iθ + 1.
5: if iθ ≤ Lθ then
6: Recommend action αθ [iθ ].
7: else
8: Recommend the best explored action of type θ .
The BIC property follows easily from Claim 4.6. The key is that Algorithm 2 explores all eventually-
explorable type-action pairs.
The following lemma compares the exploration of Algorithm 2 with l phases and some other BIC rec-
ommendation policy with l rounds. Notice that a phase in Algorithm 2 has many rounds.
Lemma 4.7. Fix phase l > 0 and the sequence of agent types θ1, ...,θT . Assume Algorithm 2 has been running
for at least min(l, |A| · |Θ|) phases. For a given state ω, if type-action pair (θ ,a) can be explored by some BIC
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recommendation policy π at round l with positive probability, then such action is explored by Algorithm 2 by
the end of phase min(l, |A| · |Θ|) with probability 1.
Proof. We prove this by induction on l for l ≤ |A| · |Θ|. Base case l = 1 is trivial by Claim 4.6. Assuming
the lemma is correct for l − 1, let’s prove it’s correct for l .
Let S = Sl be the signal of Algorithm 2 by the end of phase l − 1. Let S ′ be the history of π in the first
l − 1 rounds. More precisely, S ′ = (R,H1, ...,Hl−1), where R is the internal randomness of policy π , and
Ht = (Θt ,At ,u(Θt ,At ,ω0)) is the type-action-reward triple in round t of policy π .
The proof plan is as follows. We first show that I (S ′;ω0 |S) = 0. Informally, this means the information
collected in the first l−1 phases of Algorithm 2 contains all the information S ′ has about the statew0. After
that, we will use the information monotonicity lemma to show that phase l of Algorithm 2 explores all the
action-type pairs π might explore in round l .
First of all, we have
I (S ′;ω0 | S) = I (R,H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 | S)
= I (R;ω0 | S) + I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 | S,R)
= I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 | S,R).
By the chain rule of mutual information, we have
I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 | S,R) = I (H1;ω0 | S,R) + · · · + I (Hl−1;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Hl−2).
For all t ∈ [l − 1], we have
I (Ht ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1) = I (Θt ,At ,u(Θt ,At ,ω0);ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1)
= I (Θt ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1)
+ I (At ,u(Θt ,At ,ω0);ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Θt )
= I (At ,u(Θt ,At ,ω0);ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Θt ).
Notice that the suggested actionAt is a deterministic function of randomness of the recommendationpolicy
R, history of previous rounds H1, ...,Ht−1 and type in the current round Θt . Also notice that, by induction
hypothesis, u(Θt ,At ,ω0) is a deterministic function of S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Θt ,At . Therefore we have
I (Ht ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1) = 0, ∀t ∈ [l − 1].
Then we get I (S ′;ω0 | S) = 0.
By Lemma 4.4, we know that EX[S ′] ⊆ EX[S]. For state ω, there exists a signal s ′ such that Pr[S ′ =
s ′ | ω0 = ω] > 0 and a ∈ EXs ′[S ′]. Now let s be the realized value of S given ω0 = ω, we know that
Pr[S ′ = s ′ | S = s] > 0, so a ∈ EXs [S]. By Claim 4.6, we know that at least one agent of type θ in phase l
of Algorithm 2 will choose action a.
Now consider the case when l > |A| · |Θ|. Define ALG to be the variant of Algorithm 2 such that it only
does exploration (removing the if-condition and exploitation in Algorithm 2). For l > |A| · |Θ|, the above
induction proof still work for ALG, i.e. for a given state ω, if an action a of type θ can be explored by a BIC
recommendation policy π at round l , then such action is guaranteed to be explored by ALG by the end of
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phase l . Now we are going to argue that ALG won’t explore any new action-type pairs after phase |A| · |Θ|.
Call a phase exploring if in that phase ALG explores at least one new action-type pair. As there are |A| · |Θ|
type-action pairs, ALG can have at most |A| · |Θ| exploring phases. On the other hand, once ALG has a
phase that is not exploring, because the signal stays the same after that phase, all phases afterwards are
not exploring. So, ALG does not have any exploring phases after phase |A| · |Θ|. For l > |A| · |Θ|, the first
|A| · |Θ| phases of Algorithm 2 explores the same set of type-action pairs as the first l phases of ALG. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 2 is BIC by Claim 4.6. By Lemma 4.7, Algorithm 2 explores all the
eventually-explorable type-actions pairs after |A| · |Θ| phases. After that, for each agent type θ , Algorithm
2 recommends the best explored action:
argmaxa∈Aω,θ u(θ ,a,ω) with probability exactly 1.6
Therefore Algorithm 2 gets reward OPT except rounds in the first |A| · |Θ| phases. It remains to prove
that the expected number of rounds in exploration (i.e. first |A| · |Θ| phases) does not depend on the time
horizonT . Let Nl be the duration of phase l . Recall that the phase ends as soon as each type has shown up
at least Lθ times. It follows that E[Nl ] ≤
∑
θ ∈Θ
Lθ
Pr[θ ] . So, one can takeC = |A| · |Θ| ·
∑
θ ∈Θ
Lθ
Pr[θ ] . 
4.3 Extension to Reported Types
We sketch how to extend our ideas for public types to handle the case of reported types. We’d like to simu-
late the recommendation policy for public types, call it πpub. We simulate it separately for the exploration
part and the exploitation part. The exploitation part is fairly easy: we provide a menu that recommends
the best explored action for each agent types.
In the exploration part, in each round t we guess the agent type to be θˆt , with equal probability among
all types.7 The idea is to simulate πpub only in lucky rounds when we guess correctly, i.e., θˆt = θt . Thus, in
each round t we simulate the lt -th round of πpub, where lt is the number of lucky rounds before round t . In
each round t of exploration, we suggest the following menu. For type θˆt , we recommend the same action
as πpub would recommend for this type in the lt -th round, namely aˆt = π
lt
pub
(θˆt ). For any other type, we
recommend the action which has the best expected reward given the “common knowledge" (information
available before round 1) and the action aˆt . This is to ensure that in a lucky round, the menu does not
convey any information beyond action aˆt . When we receive the reported type, we can check whether our
guess was correct. If so, we input the type-action-reward triple back to πpub. Else, we ignore this round, as
if it never happened.
Thus, our recommendation policy eventually explores the same type-action pairs as πpub. The expected
number of rounds increases by the factor of |Θ|. Thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.8. Consider Bayesian Exploration with reported types. There exists a BIC recommendation policy
whose expected total reward is at least (T −C) · OPTpub, for some constant C that depends on the problem
instance but not onT . This policy explores all type-action pairs that are eventually-explorable for public types.
6This holds with probability exactly 1, provided that our algorithm finishes |A| · |Θ| phases. If some undesirable low-probability
event happens, e.g., if all agents seen so far have had the same type, our algorithm would never finish |A| · |Θ| phases.
7We guess the types uniformly, rather than according to their probabilities, because our goal is to explore each type for certain
number of rounds. Guessing a type according to its probability will only make rare types appear even rarer.
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5 PRIVATE TYPES
Our recommendation policy for private types satisfies a relaxed version of the BIC property, called δ -BIC,
where the right-hand side in (1) is −δ for some fixed δ > 0. We assume amore permissive behavioral model
in which agents obey such policy.
The main result is as follows. (Throughout, OPT = OPTpri.)
Theorem 5.1. Consider Bayesian Exploration with private types, and fix δ > 0. There exists a δ -BIC rec-
ommendation policy with expected total reward at least (T −C logT ) · OPT, where C depends on the problem
instance but not on time horizon T .
The recommendation policy proceeds in phases: in each phase, it explores all menus that can be explored
given the information collected so far. The crucial step in the proof is to show that:
(P1) the first l phases of our recommendation policy explore all the menus that could be possibly explored
by the first l rounds of any BIC recommendation policy.
The new difficulty for private types comes from the fact that we are exploring menus instead of type-
actions pairs, and we do not learn the reward of a particular type-action pair immediately. This is because
a recommended menu may map several different types to the chosen action, so knowing the latter does
not immediately reveal the agent’s type. Moreover, the full “outcome" of a particular menu is a distribution
over action-reward pairs, it is, in general, impossible to learn this outcome exactly in any finite number of
rounds. Because of these issues, we cannot obtain Property (P1) exactly. Instead, we achieve an approximate
version of this property, as long as we explore each menu enough times in each phase.
We then show that this approximate version of (P1) suffices to guarantee explorability, if we relax the
incentives property of our policy from BIC to δ -BIC, for any fixed δ > 0. In particular, we prove an
approximate version of the information-monotonicity lemma (Lemma 4.4) which (given the approximate
version of (P1)) ensures that our recommendation policy can explore all the menus that could be possibly
explored by the first l rounds of any BIC recommendation policy.
5.1 A Single round of Bayesian Exploration
Recall that for a random variable S , called signal, the signal structure is a joint distribution of (ω,S).
Definition 5.2. Consider a single-round of Bayesian Exploration when the principal has signal S from
signal structure S. For any δ ≥ 0, a menu m ∈ M is called δ -signal-explorable, for a given signal s, if
there exists a single-round δ -BIC recommendation policy π such that Pr[π (s) = m] > 0. The set of all
such menus is denoted as EXδs [S]. The δ -signal-explorable set is defined as EXδ [S] = EXδS [S]. We omit δ
in EXδ [S] when δ = 0.
Approximate Information Monotonicity. In the following definition, we define a way to compare two
signals approximately.
Definition 5.3. Let S and S ′ be two random variables. We say random variable S is α-approximately
informative as random variable S ′ about state ω0 if I (S ′;ω0 |S) = α .
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Lemma 5.4. Let S and S ′ be two random variables and S and S ′ be their signal structures. If S is (δ 2/8)-
approximately informative as S ′ about state ω0 (i.e. I (S ′;ω0 |S) ≤ δ 2/8), then EXs ′[S ′] ⊆ EXδs [S] for all s ′, s
such that Pr[S = s,S ′ = s ′] > 0.
Proof. For each signal realization s, denote
Ds = DKL ( ((S ′,ω0) | S = s) ‖ (S ′ |S = s) × (ω0 | S = s) ) .
We have
∑
s Pr[S = s] · D = I (S ′;ω0 |S) ≤ δ 2/8.
By Pinsker’s inequality, we have∑
s
Pr[S = s] ·
∑
s ′,ω
| Pr[S ′ = s ′,ω0 = ω |S = s]
− Pr[S ′ = s ′ |S = s] · Pr[ω0 = ω |S = s]|
≤ ∑s Pr[S = s] · √2 ln(2) · Ds
≤
√
2
∑
s Pr[S = s] · Ds ≤ δ/2.
Consider any BIC recommendation policy π ′ for signal structure S ′. We construct π for signature struc-
ture S by setting
Pr[π (s) =m] = ∑s ′ Pr[π ′(s ′) =m] · Pr [S ′ = s ′ |S = s].
Now we check π is δ -BIC. For anym,m′ ∈ M and θ ∈ Θ,
∑
ω,s Pr[ω0 = ω] · Pr[S = s |ω0 = ω]
· (u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,m′(θ ),ω)) · Pr[π (s) =m]
=
∑
ω,s,s ′ Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s] · Pr[S ′ = s ′ |S = s] · Pr[π ′(s ′) =m]
· (u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,m′(θ ),ω))
≥ ∑ω,s,s ′ Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s,S ′ = s ′] · Pr[π ′(s ′) =m]
· (u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,m′(θ ),ω))
− 2 ·
∑
ω,s,s ′
| Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s] · Pr[S ′ = s ′ |S = s]
− Pr[ω0 = ω,S = s,S ′ = s ′]|
=
∑
ω,s ′
Pr[ω0 = ω,S ′ = s ′] · Pr[π ′(s ′) =m]
· (u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,m′(θ ),ω))
− 2 ·
∑
s
Pr[S = s] ·
∑
s ′,ω
| Pr[S ′ = s ′,ω0 = ω |S = s]
− Pr[S ′ = s ′ |S = s] · Pr[ω0 = ω |S = s]|
≥ 0 − 2 · t δ2 = −δ .
We also have for any s ′, s,m such that Pr[S ′ = s ′,S = s] > 0 and Pr[π ′(s ′) =m] > 0, we have Pr[π (s) =
m] > 0. This implies EXs ′[S ′] ⊆ EXδs [S]. 
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Max-Support Policy. We can solve the following LP to check whether a particular menu m0 ∈ A is
signal-explorable given a particular realized signal s0 ∈ X. In this LP, we represent a policy π as a set of
numbers xm,s = Pr[π (s) =m], for each menum ∈ M and each feasible signal s ∈ X.
maximize xm0,s0
subject to:∑
ω ∈Ω,s ∈X
Pr[ω] · Pr[s |ω] · (u(θ ,m(θ ),ω) − u(θ ,m′(θ ),ω) + δ )
· xm,s ′ ≥ 0 ∀m,m′ ∈ M,θ ∈ Θ∑
m∈M xm,s = 1, ∀s ∈ X
xm,s ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ X,m ∈ M
Since the constraints in this LP characterize any δ -BIC recommendation policy, it follows that menum0
is δ -signal-explorable given realized signal s0 if and only if the LP has a positive solution. If such solution
exists, define recommendation policy π = πm0,s0 by setting Pr[π (s) = m] = xm,s for all m ∈ M, s ∈ X.
Then this is a δ -BIC recommendation policy such that Pr[π (s0) =m0] > 0.
Definition 5.5. Given a signal structure S, a recommendation policy π is called the δ -max-support policy
if ∀s ∈ X and δ -signal-explorable menum ∈ M given s, Pr[π (s) =m] > 0.
It is easy to see that we obtain δ -max-support recommendation policy by averaging the πm,s policies
define above. Specifically, the following policy is a δ -BIC and δ -max-support policy.
πmax =
1
|X|
∑
s ∈X
1
|EXδs [S]|
∑
m∈EXδs [S]
πm,s . (6)
Maximal Exploration. Let us design a subroutine, called MaxExplore, which outputs a sequence of L
menus. We are going to assume L ≥ maxm,s Bm (γ0)Pr[πmax (s)=m] . γ0 is defined in Algorithm 5 of Section 5.2. Bm
is defined in Lemma 5.7.
The goal of this subroutine MaxExplore is to make sure that for any signal-explorable menum,m shows
up at least Bm(γ0) times in the sequence with probability exactly 1. On the other hand, we want that the
menu of each specific location in the sequence has marginal distribution same as πmax .
16
Algorithm 4 Subroutine MaxExplore
1: Input: signal S , signal structure S.
2: Output: a list of menus µ
3: Compute πmax as per (6).
4: Initialize Res = L.
5: for each menum ∈ M do
6: Cm ← L · Pr[πmax (S) =m].
7: Add ⌊Cm⌋ copies of menum into list µ.
8: Res ← Res − ⌊Cm⌋.
9: pRes (m) ← Cm − ⌊Cm⌋
10: pRes (m) ← pRes (m)/Res, ∀m ∈ M.
11: Sample Res many menus from distribution pRes independently and add these menus into µ.
12: Randomly permute the menus in µ.
13: return µ.
Similarly as the MaxExplore in Section 4, we have the following:
Claim 5.6. Given realized signal S , MaxExplore outputs a sequence of L menus. Each menu in the sequence
marginally distributed as πmax . For any menum such that Pr[πmax = m] > 0,m shows up in the sequence
at least Bm(γ0) times with probability exactly 1. MaxExplore runs in time polynomial in L, |M|, |Ω|, |X| (size
of the support of the signal).
Menu Exploration. If an agent in a given round follows a given menum, an action-reward pair is revealed
to the algorithm after the round. Such action-reward pair is called a sample of the menu m. Let Dm(ω)
denote the distribution of this action-reward pair for a fixed state ω (with randomness coming from the
agent arrivals).
We compute an estimate ∆m of Dm(ω0). This estimate is a triple-list: an explicit list of (action, reward,
positive probability) triples.
Lemma 5.7. For any γ > 0, we can compute a triple-list ∆m which is a function of Bm(γ ) = O (ln 1/γ )
samples of menum such that
∀ω ∈ Ω Pr[∆m , Dm(ω) | ω0 = ω] ≤ γ .
Proof. Let U be the union of the support of Dm(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. For each u ∈ U (u is just a sample of
the menu), define
q(u,ω) = Pr
v∼Dm (ω)
[v = u].
Let δm be small enough such that for all ω,ω ′ with Dm(ω) , Dm(ω ′), there exists u ∈ U , such that
|q(u,ω) − q(u,ω ′)| > δm .
Now we compute ∆m as follows: Take Bm(γ ) = 2δ 2m ln
(
2 |U |
γ
)
samples and set qˆ(u) as the empirical
frequency of seeing u. And set ∆m to be some Dm(ω) such that for all u ∈ U , |q(u,ω) − qˆ(u)| ≤ δm/2.
Notice that if such ω exists, ∆m will be unique. If no ω satisfies this, just pick ∆m to be an arbitraryDm(ω).
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Algorithm 5Main procedure for private types
1: Initialize: signal S1 = S1 =⊥, phase l = 1.
2: { Sl and Sl are the signal and signal structure in phase l . }
3: Set γ1 = min
(
δ 2
16 |M | log( |Ω |) ,
(
δ 2
32 |M |
)2)
and γ2 =
1
T |M | .
4: Set γ0 = min(γ1,γ2).
5: for rounds t = 1 to T do
6: if phase l ≤ |M| then
7: {Exploration}
8: if t ≡ 1 (mod L) then
9: Start a new phase:
10: µ ← MaxExplore(Sl ,Sl ) {compute a list of L menus}
11: Suggest menu µ[(t − 1) mod L + 1] to the agent.
12: if t ≡ 0 (mod L) then
13: End of a phase:
14: for each explored menum in the previous phase do
15: use Bm(γ1) samples to compute ∆m from Lemma 5.7
16: If no state ω ∈ Ω is consistent with ∆m (i.e., ∆m = Dm(ω)) for all explored menusm then
17: pick any state ω, and set ∆m ← Dm(ω) for all explored menusm.
{to ensure that #signals is bounded by |Ω|.}
18: l ← l + 1.
19: Set Sl = { ∆m : all explored menusm }.
20: Set Sl to be the signal structure of Sl .
21: else
22: {Exploitation}
23: if this is the first exploitation round then
24: for each menum explored during exploration do
25: use Bm(γ2) samples to compute ∆m from Lemma 5.7.
26: Set Sl = { ∆m : all explored menusm }.
27: Suggest the menu which consists of the best action of each type conditioned on Sl and the prior.
Now let’s analyze Pr[∆m , Dm(ω)]. Let’s fix the state ω0 = ω. By Chernoff bound, for each u ∈ U ,
Pr[|q(u,ω) − qˆ(u)| > δm/2] ≤ 2 exp
(−2 · (δm/2)2 · Bm(γ )) ≤ γ/|U |.
By union bound, with probability at least 1−γ , we have for all u ∈ U , |q(u,ω) − qˆ(u)| ≤ δm/2. This implies
∆m = Dm(ω). 
5.2 Main Recommendation Policy
In this subsection, we develop our main recommendation policy, Algorithm 5 (see pseudo-code), which
explores all the eventually-explorable menus and then recommends the agents the best menu given all
history. We pick L to be at least
max
m,s :Pr[π (s)=m]>0
Bm(γ0)
Pr[π (s) =m]
for all π that might be chosen as πmax by Algorithm 5.
It is easy to check by Claim 5.6 that for each agent, it is δ -BIC to follow the recommended action if
previous agents all follow the recommended actions. Therefore we have the following claim.
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Claim 5.8. Algorithm 5 is δ -BIC.
Lemma 5.9. For any l > 0, assume Algorithm 5 has at least min(l, |M|) phases. For a given state ω, if a
menum can be explored by a BIC recommendation policy π at round l (i.e. Pr[π l =m] > 0), then such menu
is guaranteed to be explored Bm times by Algorithm 5 by the end of phase min(l, |M|).
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 4.7. We prove by induction on l for l ≤ |M|.
Let S be the signal of Algorithm 5 in phase l . Let S ′ be the history of π in the first l − 1 rounds. More
precisely, S ′ = R,H1, ...,Hl−1. Here R is the internal randomness of π and
Ht = (Mt ,At ,u(Θt ,Mt (Θt ),ω0))
is the menu and the action-reward pair in round t of π .
LetM ′ to be the set ofmenus explored in the first l−1 phases of Algorithm 5. By the induction hypothesis,
we have ∀t ∈ [l − 1], Mt ⊆ M ′. Then:
I (S ′;ω0 |S) = I (R,H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 |S)
= I (R;ω0 |S) + I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 |S,R)
= I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 |S,R).
By the chain rule of mutual information, we have
I (H1, ...,Hl−1;ω0 |S,R) = I (H1;ω0 |S,R) + I (H2;ω0 |S,R,H1) + · · · + I (Hl−1;ω0 |S,R,H1, ...,Hl−2).
For all t ∈ [l − 1], we have
I (Ht ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1) = I (Mt ,At ,u(Θt ,Mt (Θt ),ω0);ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1)
= I (At ,u(Θt ,Mt (Θt ),ω0);ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Mt )
≤ I (DMt ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Mt ).
The second last step comes from the fact thatMt is a deterministic function of R,H1, ...,Ht−1. The last step
comes from the fact that (At ,u(Θt ,Mt (Θt ),ω0)) is independent with ω0 given DMt .
Then we have
I (DMt ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Mt ) =
∑
m∈M′ Pr[Mt =m] · I (Dm ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1,Mt =m)
≤ ∑m∈M ′ Pr[Mt =m] · I (Dm ;ω0 | ∆m,Mt =m).
≤ ∑m∈M ′ Pr[Mt =m] ·H (Dm | ∆m ,Mt =m).
The last step comes from the fact that
I (Dm ; (S\∆m),R,H1, ...,Ht−1 | ω0,∆m,Mt =m) = 0.
By Lemma 5.7, we know that Pr[Dm , ∆m | Mt =m] ≤ γ1. By Fano’s inequality, we have
H (Dm | ∆m,Mt =m) ≤ H (γ1) + γ1 log(|Ω| − 1)
≤ 2√γ1 + γ1 log(|Ω| − 1) ≤ δ 216 |M | + δ
2
16 |M | =
δ 2
8 |M | .
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Therefore we have
I (Ht ;ω0 | S,R,H1, ...,Ht−1) ≤ δ 28 |M | ,∀t ∈ [l − 1].
Then we get I (S ′;ω0 | S) ≤ δ 2/8.
By Lemma 5.4, we know that EXs ′[S ′] ⊆ EXδs [S]. By Claim 5.6, we know that phase l will explore menu
m at least Bm(γ0) times.
When l > |M|, we use the same argument as the last paragraph of the proof of Lemma 4.7. 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By Claim 5.8, Algorithm 5 is δ -BIC.
By Lemma 5.9, for each state ω, Algorithm 5 explores all the eventually-explorable menus (i.e.Mω ) by
the end of |M| phases.
After that, by Lemma 5.7 and γ2 =
1
T |M | , for a fixed state ω, we know that with probability 1 − 1/T ,
δm = Dm for allm ∈ Mω . In this case, the agent of type θ gets expected reward at leastu(θ ,m∗(θ ),ω)where
menum∗ = argmaxm∈Mω
∑
θ ∈Θ Pr[θ ] · u(θ ,m(θ ),ω). Taking average over types, the expected reward per
round should be at least (1 − 1/T ) ·maxm∈Mω
∑
θ ∈Θ Pr[θ ] · u(θ ,m(θ ),ω).
The expected number of rounds of the first |M| phases is |M| · L = O(ln(T )). Therefore, Algorithm 5
has expected total reward at least T · OPT −T · (1/T ) −O(ln(T )) = T · OPT −O(ln(T )). 
A BASICS OF INFORMATION THEORY
We briefly review some standard facts and definitions from information theory which are used in proofs.
For a more detailed introduction, see [17]. Throughout, X ,Y ,Z ,W are random variables that take values
in an arbitrary domain (not necessarily R).
Entropy. The fundamental notion is entropy of a random variable. In particular, if X has finite support, its
entropy is defined as
H (X ) = −∑x p(x) · logp(x), where p(x) = Pr[X = x].
(Throughout this paper, we use log to refer to the base 2 logarithm and use ln to refer to the natural
logarithm.) If X is drawn from Bernoulli distribution with E[X ] = p, then
H (p) = −(p logp + (1 − p)(log(1 − p)).
The conditional entropy of X given event E is the entropy of the conditional distribution (X |E):
H (X |E) = −∑x p(x) · logp(x), where p(x) = Pr[X = x |E].
The conditional entropy of X given Y is
H (X |Y ) := Ey [H (X |Y = y)] =
∑
y Pr[Y = y] · H (X |Y = y).
Note that H (X |Y ) = H (X ) if X and Y are independent.
We are sometimes interested in the entropy of a tuple of random variables, such as (X ,Y ,Z ). To simplify
notation, we writeH (X ,Y ,Z ) instead ofH ((X ,Y ,Z )), and similarly in other information-theoretic notation.
Now, we formulate the Chain Rule for entropy:
H (X ,Y ) = H (X ) +H (Y |X ). (7)
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We also use the following fundamental fact about entropy:
Lemma A.1 (Fano’s Inequality). Let X ,Y , Xˆ be random variables such that Xˆ is a deterministic function of
Y .8 Let E = {Xˆ , X } be the “error event". Then, letting X denote the support set of X ,
H (X |Y ) ≤ H (E) + Pr[E] · (log(|X| − 1),
Mutual info. The mutual information between X and Y is
I (X ;Y ) := H (X ) −H (X |Y ) = H (Y ) −H (Y |X ).
The conditional mutual information between X and Y given Z is
I (X ;Y |Z ) := H (X |Z ) −H (X |Y ,Z ) = H (Y |Z ) −H (Y |X ,Z ).
Note that I (X ;Y |Z ) = I (X ;Y ) if X ,Z are conditionally independent given Y , and Y ,Z are conditionally
independent given X .
Important properties of conditional mutual information are:
I (X ,Y ;Z |W ) = I (X ;Z |W ) + I (Y ;Z |W ,X ) (8)
I (X ;Y |Z ) ≥ I (X ;Y |Z ,W ) if I (Y ;W |X ,Z ) = 0 (9)
I (X ;Y |Z ) ≤ I (X ;Y |Z ,W ) if I (Y ;W |Z ) = 0 (10)
KL-divergence. The Kullback-Leibler divergence (a.k.a., KL-divergence) between random variables X and
Y is defined as
DKL(X ‖Y ) =
∑
x
Pr[X = x] · log
(
Pr[X = x]
Pr[Y = x]
)
.
Note that the definition is not symmetric, in the sense that in generalDKL(X ‖Y ) , DKL(Y ‖X ). KL-divergence
can be related to conditional mutual information as follows:
I (X ;Y |Z ) = Ex,z [ DKL((Y |X = x,Z = z)‖(Y |Z = z)) ]
=
∑
x,z
Pr[X = x,Z = z] DKL((Y |X = x,Z = z)‖(Y |Z = z)). (11)
Here (Y |E) denotes the conditional distribution of Y given event E.
We also use Pinsker Inequality:
∑
x | Pr[X = x] − Pr[Y = x]| ≤
√
2 ln(2)DKL(X ‖Y ). (12)
8Informally, Xˆ is an approximate version of X derived from signal Y .
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